Abstract-Developing and evaluating exterior physical security system alternatives can be a daunting task. Once alternatives are identified, they must be evaluated not to only the set of threats they provide against, but also to other factors such as cost, performance, schedule and environmental impact. This article describes a systematic approach of applying decision analysis tools and techniques to develop, and quantitatively evaluate a set of design alternatives and its associated security technologies. The intent is to provide an annotated checklist to guide security system designers when dealing with uncertainties in exterior physical security system design.
INTRODUCTION
The process of designing, analyzing, and selecting an exterior physical security system (EPSS) can be challenging giving the uncertainties such as the evolving threats, changing system requirements and the possibility that the current set of security technologies under consideration may be obsolete by the time the design is deployed. A strategy to assist the designers in making informed design decisions is to use decision analysis process and techniques to select a complement set of security technologies to rank and evaluate the physical security design alternatives, thereby resulting in a more flexible and robust design solution. This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides a brief overview of physical security principles. Section 3 describes how to systematically apply decision analysis process to develop and evaluate of physical protection system alternatives. Section 4 summarizes key points.
II. PHYSICAL SECURITY PRINCIPLES OVERVIEW
Design of an effective EPSS requires designers to balance between available resources like cost, security performance, security technology elements, deployment location, personnel, etc. against the objectives of the EPSS. The primary objective of an EPSS is to secure or protect a high value asset or a set of assets against theft, sabotage, and other malevolent attacks. In order to accomplish this, the designers need to first thoroughly characterize the facility and its operations, define the relevant threats, and identify the protected assets. Second they will need to identify a set of security technologies that matches the physical assessment for the overall EPSS's goals. Once these tasks are completed, they will need to develop creative and doable physical security designs that provide effective detection, delay, and response functionalities with minimal nuisance alarm.
Detection is the process of sensing an adversary action followed by an assessment of the event to verify whether there is an actual intrusion. Delay is the process of slowing down adversary progress in order to allow the response force time to respond. Response is the actions taken by the response force to interrupt and prevent adversary's progress. This includes communicating to the response force the locations and actions of the adversary. Nuisance alarm is an activation of an alarm sensor by some influence that cannot be identified as related to an intrusion attempt. If the number of nuisance alarms is too high, this can diminish the effectiveness of the physical security system. The operators will eventually ignore the alarms and critical events will be missed. This trade space between exterior physical security system's usability and its performance poses challenges to security system designers. An ideal EPSS should be usable to the operators and secure. However, increasing the EPSS's performance will incur more cost.
Other external factors such as environmental impact can further complicate the EPSS design. Environmental impact needs to be assessed to ensure that the deployed EPSS will not negatively impact its surrounding environment and any other biophysical components. In addition, the stakeholders may not have the budget to address every threat. Therefore, all these factors need to be weighted accordingly and the risk associated with each alternative will need to be identified and presented to the stakeholders.
Finally, physical security designers will need to develop, evaluate, and select an optimal EPSS design that best meets the project's objectives. Decision analysis methods can be applied here to help the EPSS designers in making better design decisions.
III. DECISION ANALYSIS PROCESS
Typically, not all information is available to the security system designers at the time of the design. Security designers are often faced with uncertainties and incomplete, inconsistent, or unknown factors. Decision analysis is the process of transforming a complex decision situation into a well formed, coherent and structured representation in order to allow the security designers to step thru the design process systematically and develop a set of alternatives, specification of preference in creating a normative approach to making decision under uncertainties when rules of thumb, intuition, traditional, and simple analysis are no longer sufficient. Decision analysis process provides a conceptual framework and techniques that allow the security designers to compare the tradeoffs among a set of alternatives given the design's objectives, criteria, type, and quality of available information.
Decision analysis methods are being applied in all areas including engineering, manufacturing, health care, government, finance and economics. Decision analysis helps security designers make better decisions and facilitate high quality and logical discussions. Traditional approach to decision making is to advocate and sell a desired decision. This approach often results in unresolved ambiguities, lingering uncertainties, and leads to a lack of buy-in among the team members. Without having clear system requirements and non-conflicting objectives, more often than not, the final design solution will not address the real design goals. Decision analysis process forces the EPSS designers to
• Establish a decision board with representation from members of the design team, decision makers (funding stakeholders), end-users, and other appropriate stakeholders. Each member should have a clear understanding of his or her role and responsibilities within the decision board.
• Frame the problem by identifies the design's assumptions, constraints, givens, issues, uncertainties, boundaries, success criteria, and objectives hierarchy. This step helps specify what exactly the project is trying to achieve.
• Develop creative, doable and unique design alternatives.
• Apply decision analysis tools to rank and evaluate the tradeoffs among the alternatives.
• Discuss the results and associated risks.
A. Decision Board
The first step in the decision analysis process is to identify key members that make up the decision board. It is important that the key stakeholders, decision makers, end-users of the system, systems engineers, subject matter experts, and project owner (funding stakeholder) be on the decision board. The decision board is responsible for making the decisions, implementing the decisions, and managing the risks once the decisions are made. In addition, the decision board also assists the design team in transforming prescriptive requirements into testable requirements. That is, each requirement is broken down into precise and unambiguous statements so that it can be validated whether or not it has been implemented correctly. Decision board plays an important role in the decision analysis process.
It is the conduit that enables constructive conversations between the decision makers and design team. It is imperative and critical to keep the decision board informed of the current project design issues and status and incorporate the decision board's input throughout the decision analysis process at key dialog points. The security designers should conduct reviews with decision board at the end of each decision analysis process step; e.g., problem framing, creation of design alternatives, evaluation and agreement, and implementing and monitoring. This ensures coordinated actions and the ability to maximize benefit from the decision being made at each step in the process.
B. Problem Framing
The goals of framing the problem are to clearly articulate the objectives that the security designers are trying to achieve; what the problem is, why they are doing this, and how do they know if they have successful solved the problem. Framing the problem is a discovery process that should:
• Assist the design team to validate and verify their assumptions, constraints, issues, boundaries, givens, success criteria, uncertainty variables, and any other factors that can affect the security design directly or indirectly.
• Provide a common baseline for the decision board and security designers to communicate and identify problems and opportunities.
• Motivate decision board participation and involvement.
• Allow the security designers to gain important feedback from the decision board early in the development process.
• Help prevent misunderstanding between the decision board and security designers.
• Strengthen working relationships between the decision board and security designers.
In other words, by executing this step, the security designers should expect informative good dialogues that will lead to mutual understanding of the problem with the decision board.
Most of the security design problems stem from asking the wrong questions, having the wrong assumptions and constraints. Hence, cause the design team not to address the real problems. Before attempting to start developing security design solution alternatives, it is advantageous for the security designers to have a purpose statement, an official project requirements document, a set of clear and concise design's objectives, a list of measurable success criteria, a list of assumptions, facts and constraints, and commitment and buy-in from the decision board.
Design objectives are further decomposed into fundamental objectives that together create an objective hierarchy diagram. This is done by grouping key objectives that have specific relationship and nature of each other (Figure 1 ). The objective hierarchy diagram will be used to generate the strategy table. A strategy is a coherent set of actions that represent a design alternative. By performing this step, the design team can immediately focus on a course of actions and avoid taking the wrong analysis path. Following is an example of how problem framing can be applied to select a set of sensor technologies that satisfies the security design's objective. The security designers need to:
• Identify a list of success criteria for selecting a set of complementary security technologies that are going to be used in the final security design solution. For example, the design may need to select sensor technologies that have low bandwidth, low power consumption, low nuisance alarm rate, and the appropriate technology readiness level (TRL) ( Figure  2 ). TRL is a measure to assess the maturity of technologies. It ranges from level 1 (basic technology research) to level 9 (system test, launch, and operations).
• Understand the problem boundaries. Does the security system need to secure only the land region, water region, or both? This may require the security designers to look into selecting different types of sensor technologies such as line sensors (sensors that will trigger an alarm when the detection plane is breached), in-ground sensors (sensor that can be buried in ground and will trigger an alarm when detecting the presence of persons within its vicinity), and volumetric sensors (sensors that will trigger an alarm when people and vehicles are detected in a specific open area).
• Know the design's objectives, e.g., optimize for performance, cost, or schedule.
• Understand the impact of the EPSS on the environmental, e.g., what is the maximum active energy that the security system is allowed to output, or can wired or wireless data transmission be used in this environment, etc. Table sample . Column A is a list of criteria that each of the sensor technology is rated against.
C. Developing Security Design Alternatives
Once the problem framing step is complete, the next step in the process is to develop a set of alternatives that address the design's objectives. This is done by conducting brainstorming sessions with the team (end-users, policy makers, and subject matter experts of all disciplines that are relevant to the project) to create a strategy table. Sometimes, it is useful to develop a influence diagram before creating the strategy table. The influence diagram displays visually the dependencies among the existing decisions, uncertainties, objectives, and external factors for a given problem (Figure 3) . The diagram provides a high-level of the overall cause and effect relationships and highlights the key issues to facilitate effective communication among the members of the decision board. The influence diagram consists of 3 types of nodes:
• Decision node ( ) is the variable that the decision maker have controlled.
• Chance node ( ) is an uncertain variable.
• Objective node (
) is a quantitative criterion that is being maximize or minimize.
• The arrow denotes the direction of influence.
The strategy table contains a single strategy themes column heading and a set of categories of design options listed as column headings, with the possible actions within each category (Figure 4 ). The strategy themes represent different approaches to achieve the design's objectives. For example, if a design's objective is to provide detection, and this can be achieved by designing a new EPSS, or refurbishing the existing EPSS, then the strategy themes are "new" and "refurbish".
Note each alternative is a combination of actions from several categories. For example, the selected actions in figure  4 describe a new physical security system that has a fence with the sensor location on the outer road. In addition, there is redundancy in this alternative and the accepted dredging impact is medium. The strategy table is one of the most useful tools for developing creative alternatives. This tool enables the team to develop achievable, unique and comprehensive alternatives.
D. Ranking and Evaluating Alternatives
After developing security design alternatives, it is time to create a consequence table that captures the performance of each alternative relative to the design's objectives. This can be as simple as using a rating table or as complex as applying the Kepner Tregoe method to prioritize and evaluate alternatives.
The design team along with the subject matter experts (SMEs) is asked to assign a score between 1 (worst) and 5 (best) for each criterion for each alternative based on their knowledge and experience ( Figure 5 ). Next, calculate the total value by adding all the scores in each column for each alternative, and select the alternative with the highest value. Below is a sample rating table that ranked each alternative against the system initial cost, annual life cycle cost, system performance, environmental performance, and dredging impact. In the Kepner Tregoe method, the security designers need to determine which success criteria are "must have" and which are "nice to have". The "must have" criteria are ones that must be met in order for the security design to function properly and the "nice to have" criteria are ones that would be good to have in the design but are not essential to the design functionality. For the "must have" criteria, each criterion is assigned with a relative weight of 1 (highest). For the "nice to have" criteria, each criterion is assigned with a relative weight of .1 to .9. The net value for each is computed by multiplying the assigned value by the relative weight of each criterion ( Figure 6 ). Again, the total score is computed by adding all the scores in each column for each alternative. Again, depending on the required depth of the analysis and available resources, the security designers should select the appropriate method for the problem.
Often, a simple consequence table is sufficient to help the decision makers understand the tradeoffs between alternatives. For some cases, a more quantitative analyses will be needed to further signify the small differences between alternatives.
For problems that involve uncertainty such as cost, resource allocation, and others that can influence the design outcomes, decision analysis tool such as a decision tree can be used to better understand the various pathways and consequences associated with each alternative considered. A decision tree is a visual and analytical decision analysis tool that models the chronological representation of the decision process. It helps identified an alternative that likely to meet most the design's objectives. A decision tree consists of two types of nodes:
IV. SUMMARY The process of designing, analyzing, and selecting an exterior physical security system involves much more than just identifying the optimal set of security technologies. Security designers are also expected to balance cost, security performance, security technology elements, and environmental impact against the objectives of the EPSS. Thus making design decisions more critical and comprehensive.
• Decision (choice) nodes which are represented by square shapes.
• Chance (states of nature nodes) nodes are represented by circle shapes.
The decision tree is constructed by starting out with a root (decision) node and spans from left to right. The branches spanning from each decision node represent all the possible decision alternatives that are available. The number on each branch of the chance node represents the probability that the outcome will occur at the chance node. The end point on each path following from left to right on the decision tree represents the final outcome. Each end point outcome is given a value. This value is determined by the design team.
Applying decision analysis techniques to physical security design should improve the quality of design decisions, increase the likelihood of making better design decisions and provide insight into potential design problems. This paper presents a step by step approach to assist physical security designers in developing and evaluating security design alternatives. Several key aspects include:
• The decision board's perspectives matter. It is important to understand their objectives and constraints. After all, the decision board is responsible for making the decisions, implementing the decisions, and managing the risks once the decisions are made.
To decide which decision alternative to select, the design team must compute the expected value. The expected value (EV)is a criterion for making decision that takes into account of all possible outcomes for each decision alternative and its associated probability. It is calculated by multiplying the value of the outcomes by their probability, and summing the results. The alternative with the highest expected value is best for problems involving benefits, and the alternative with the lowest expected value is best for problems involving cost (Figure 7 ). The example below shows that it is better to collaborate with the vendor to develop the grate sensor than to develop it inhouse.
• Disagreement between security design team members will occur and while having everyone consensus is desirable, it is not mandatory. For cases where this could happen, the reasons for disagreement should be documented and presented to the decision board.
• Making good decisions do not always guarantee good outcomes when dealing with uncertainty, e.g., changes in security technologies, environmental conditions, and available resources. The decision analysis process provides a framework that allows the security designers to better manage key critical uncertainties and response to the design issues.
